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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

CAROLYN CRUMP n/k/a
CAROLYN FORSGREN,

*
*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 92-0023
*

ROBERT CRUMP,

Priority No. 4

Defendant/Respondent.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This court granted Petitioners Petition for Writ of Certiorari
on or about June 22, 1992.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue before this court is whether or not the State of
Utah has the jurisdiction to modify a child custody award in the
Montana Court.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The

statutory

provisions

pertinent

to

deciding

the

issue

before this court is the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA) Section 78-45C-1, et. seq. Utah Code Annotated and the
Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 28 U.S.C. Section
1738 A (1989) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 7, 1983, a divorce was granted
herein by the Montana District Court.

to the parties

The issue of custody was

reserved by the court and decided at a later date on June 6, 1985.
The Montana Court awarded joint custody of the children to the
parties,

with

the

children

to reside

with

CAROLYN

CRUMP,

the

petitioner herein, during the school year; and the children were
to reside with ROBERT CRUMP, the respondent herein, during the
summer months.

After the divorce hearing and prior to the custody

hearing, CAROLYN CRUMP and the children moved to the State of Utah.
ROBERT CRUMP remained in the State of Montana and exercised his
joint custody with the children during the summer months.
ROBERT CRUMP filed an authenticated copy of the Montana Decree
of Divorce in the First Judicial District, County of Cache, State
of Utah in February of 1989, and filed a Petition to Modify the
Montana

Decree

at the same time.

Petition on April 24, 1990.
rendered

in

that

hearing

on

A hearing

was held

on

the

ROBERT CRUMP appealed the decision
July

13,

1990.

The

appeal

was

dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction on
November

22,

1991.

CAROLYN

CRUMP T s

Petition

for

a

Writ

of

Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court on the 22nd of
June, 1992.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both the UCCJA and the PKPA require that jurisdiction over
child custody matters remain in the state which originally entered
the custody order so long as one of the parties or a child have
remained a resident of that state.

Robert Crump did not and could

not consent to jurisdiction in the state of Utah.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties to this action were divorced by a Decree

entered by the Montana District Court on December 7, 1983Court reserved the issue of custody for a later hearing.

The

After the

Divorce and prior to the Hearing on Custody, CAROLYN CRUMP, the
Petitioner herein, moved from the State of Montana to the State of
Utah.

(R. Vol.2, P.10-12)
2.

On June

Montana Court.

6,

1985, a Custody

Hearing was held by

the

Prior to that Hearing, CAROLYN CRUMP told the

children that they would be moving back to the State of Montana.
(R.

10, Partial

Transcript

Holter, attached hereto).

of

Hearing

before

Judge

Robert

M.

The Montana Court placed the children

in the joint custody of both parties and provided that the primary
residence during the school year would be with the mother, and that
the primary place of residence during the summer vacation would be
with the father.

The Court also concluded that it was in the best

interests of the children that liberal and substantial visitation
be granted back and forth between the parties.
3.

ROBERT

CRUMP,

the

Respondent

(R. 12).

herein,

filed

an

authenticated copy of the Montana Decree of Divorce in the First
Judicial District, County of Cache, State of Utah, in February of
1989, and filed a Petition to Modify the Montana Decree at the same
time.

Judge Gordon J. Low denied the Petition of ROBERT CRUMP to

modify the child custody but did alter the visitation and modify
the child support provisions of the Montana Decree.

3

4.

ROBERT

CRUMP

at

all

times

remained

in

the

State

of

Montana and exercised his joint custody of the children in the
State of Montana by having the children with him during the summer
visitation periods as provided by the Montana Decree.
5.

ROBERT CRUMP appealed the Decision of Judge Low to the

Utah Court of Appeals, which entered an Opinion on November 22,
1991, holding that the Utah Court did not have jurisdiction to
modify the Montana Decree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MONTANA STATE COURT HAS THE SOLE JURISDICTION TO RULE
ON THE ISSUE OF MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE.
The decision of whether Montana or the State of Utah has the
jurisdiction to modify the Divorce Decree must be based upon the
provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).

All three

judges of the Court of Appeals acknowledge that the PKPA preempts
State Law and the UCCJA when the provisions are in conflict.

The

PKPA appears to be very explicit about the issue of jurisdiction.
Section 1738 A (d) states, as follows:
The jurisdiction of a court of a state which has made a
child custody determination consistently with the
provisions of this section continues as long as the
requirement of Subsection (c) (1) of this section
continues to be met and such state remains the resident
of the child or of any contestant.
Section (c)(1) states:

4

A child custody determination made by a court of a State
is consistent with the provisions of this section only
if - (1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of
such state: . . .
This section clearly states that the jurisdiction of a
state continues if that state had jurisdiction originally over the
issue and either the child or any contestant remains a resident of
that state.
issues.

There is no dispute before this Court as to those

Clearly, the State of Montana had jurisdiction originally

to enter a Divorce Decree and ROBERT CRUMP has remained a resident
of that state from the time of the Divorce Decree to the present
time.
Since Montana does have jurisdiction over the custody issue
involving the parties1 children, the question then becomes one of
whether or not Utah has concurrent jurisdiction over that issue.
Section (f) addresses that issue.

That section states:

A court of a state may modify a determination of the
custody of the same child made by the court of another
state if - (1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child
custody determination; and (2) the court of the other
state no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
The dispute about whether or not Utah has concurrent jurisdiction
with Montana seems to center around the interpretation of Section
(f)(1).

It is the position of ROBERT CRUMP, that this section

pertains to whether or not the State Court has jurisdiction over
child custody matters.

If a State Court did not have jurisdiction

to decide child custody matters, such as a circuit court, its
decision would not be valid.

If the State Court has jurisdiction

5

over child custody matters then the provisions of subparagraph (2)
must exist before the court is given any jurisdiction to modify
the decree of another state.
It is clear in the case before this Court that Montana still
has jurisdiction and to this point has not declined to exercise
that jurisdiction and Utah does not have any jurisdiction to modify
the Montana Decree.

It is not a question of whether Utah exercises

its jurisdiction, but a question of whether or not Utah has any
jurisdiction.

The only way a different result could be obtained

would be for the Court to interpret Section (f)(1) as creating dual
jurisdiction.

It is,the position of ROBERT CRUMP that there is no

persuasive argument made by the Appellant or by the Dissenting
Opinion to support this position.
Section 78-45C-14 of the Utah Code Ann., part of the UCCJA
Act, is consistent with the provisions of the PKPA.

That section

states:
(1) if a court of another state has made a custody
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that
decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state
that the court which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this act or has declined
to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.]
The

Utah

Act

clearly

requires

that

Montana

no

longer

have

jurisdiction or that it has declined to assume the jurisdiction to
modify the Decree.
a

state

having

subparagraph a ) .
minority

opinion

If that is the case and if Utah qualifies as
jurisdiction

but

for

the

requirements

then Utah may exercise its jurisdiction.
cites

subparagraph^ b)
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as

recognizing

of
The
dual

jurisdiction

and

argues

that, therefore,
ROBERT

CRUMP

it

is

a question

exercising

jurisdiction.

disagrees

position.

If the State of Montana no longer had

with

of

that

jurisdiction

because all parties had moved from the state and/or declined to
exercise this jurisdiction, an[1162saa±tix2>2x3 not be brought in Utah
unless Utah met one of the conditions for jurisdiction as set out
in Section 78-45(c)(3) of Utah Code Ann.

If Utah did not meet any

of those conditions then it would not have jurisdiction over the
case under any circumstances.
the

purpose

of

It is ROBERT CRUMP f s contention that

subparagraph(b)

is

to

prevent

a

state

from

attempting to modify a decree if it does not meet any of the other
jurisdictional requirements and if the original state no longer
has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise that jurisdiction.
Such an interpretation would serve the purposes of the UCCJA
and the PKPA by preventing a state from intervening where all the
parties had moved from the original state and none of the other
jurisdictional requirements of the Acts were met.
The fact situation involved in this case is precisely the same
as the illustration given by Professor Bodenheimer, who is the
reporter for the special committee which drafted the Uniform Act,
commenting about the provisions now contained in Section 78-45C14

of the Utah Code Ann.

Jurisdiction
Conflict

Bodenheimer in The Uniform

Act: A Legislative
of

Laws,

Remedy for Children

Child

Custody

Caught In

22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969) stated:

A typical example is the case of the couple who are
divorced in state A, their matrimonial home state, and
whose children are awarded to the wife, subject to
visitation rights of the husband. Wife and children move
7

the

to state B, with or without permission of the court to
remove the children. State A has continuing jurisdiction
and the courts in state B may not hear the wife's
petition to make her the sole custodian, eliminate
visitation rights, or make any other modification of the
decree, even though state B has in the meantime become
the 'home state' under section 3. The Jurisdiction of
state A continues and is exclusive as long as the husband
lives in state A unless he loses contact with the
children, for example, by not using his visitation
privileges for three years.
Professor Bodenheimer's comments were cited by the Utah Court of
Appeals in the case of State in the Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d
118 (Utah App. 1990), at p. 124.
Such an interpretation of the UCCJA

and the PKPA

clearly

supports a number of the purposes stated in Section 78-45(c)-l of
the UCCJA.

A party should not be able to avoid the decision of a

state court by merely moving to another state and remaining there
for six (6) months, or by taking the children to another state and
establishing significant contacts with that state.

If parties were

allowed to establish jurisdiction in another state solely on
that basis then they would be encouraged to leave the originating
state any time they were dissatisfied with its decisions or were
fearful that the state at a later date would rule against them.
Consequently,

the

interpretaton

placed

on

these

Acts

by

the

majority of the Court of Appeals avoids jurisdictional competition
and conflict, discourages continual controversies, deters abduction
and other unilateral removals of children, avoids relitigation of
custody
decrees.

decisions

and

facilitates

the

enforcement

of

custody

The interpretation of the Acts adopted by the Dissenting

Opinion, conversely, would encourage a party who was dissatisfied
8

with the state court's decision or who anticipated an unfavorable
ruling in the future to immediately move to another state for a
period of six (6) months so as to establish jurisdiction in that
state.

Such an interpretation would not be in the best interests

of parents and children who are involved in divorces or custody
disputes.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENT, ROBERT CRUMP, DID NOT VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT
HIMSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT.0 C
CAROLYN CRUMP, in her Brief, states that jurisdiction should
be exercised by this Court because ROBERT CRUMP filed a Petition
in the State of Utah and that jurisdiction has been stipulated or
conceded by this action.

It was not the intent of ROBERT CRUMP to

agree to jurisdiction in the State of Utah.

ROBERT CRUMP felt that

under the existing law he had to bring the action in the home state
of the minor children.

ROBERT CRUMP and his counsel were incorrect

in so interpreting the law.

However, there is no information before

the Court that would indicate that ROBERT CRUMP voluntarily submitted
to or stipulated to the jurisdiction of this state.

In addition, it

is a well-established principle of law that parties may not stipulate
to

the

jurisdiction

of

the

court.

jurisdiction by law or it has not.

Either

the

court

has

that

Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc. 694

P. 2d 1043 (Utah 1984) and State Department of Social Services y^
Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982).
ROBERT CRUMP filed an authenticated copy of the Montana Decree
of Divorce with the First Judicial District Court <>f Cache County,
9

in approximately February of 1989.

At the same time he filed a

Petition to Modify the Montana Decree concerning custody of the minor
children.

The first day of the Hearing on the Petition was April

24, 1990.

On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals entered its

decision in the case of State in the Interest of D.S.K, supra. That
case was not known to any of the parties or to the trial judge at the
time the Petition was being heard.

Had that Opinion been issued

prior to ROBERT CRUMP filing his Petition, he would not have filed
in the State of Utah, but would have petitioned the court in Montana.
The failure of ROBERT CRUMP and/or his attorney to understand the law
or to correctly interpret the law in question should not be viewed
as voluntarily consenting to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court.
CAROLYN CRUMP contends filing of the Montana Decree in Utah
Courts under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 78-22a-2, et.
seq., Utah Code Ann., confers jurisdiction upon the Utah Courts.
The filing of a foreign judgment in the Utah Courts allows the Utah
Court to give the judgment full faith and credit as required by the
Federal Constitution.

Even if it could be argued that that Act does

confer jurisdiction, the Act would have to be interpreted consistent
with

the

UCCJA

which

more

specifically

addresses

the

issue

of

jurisdiction in custody matters and the PKPA which supersedes any
state act as it pertains to jurisdiction over custody matters.
this

Court

nothing

interprets

those Acts

as urged

by ROBERT

CRUMP

If
then

in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act would be sufficient to

confer jurisdiction upon this Court.

10

CONCLUSIONS
ROBERT CRUMP contends that the majority decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals should be sustained and that this Court should rule
that both the PKPA and the UCCJA require that jurisdiction over child
custody matters remain in the state which originally entered the
order so long as one of the parties and/or a child have remained
residents of that state.
ROBERT CRUMP contends that the overall purpose of the Acts in
question would be furthered by such a decision,

ROBERT CRUMP also

contends that he did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of
.the State of Utah and could not have created jurisdiction in th e
State of Utah even if he had voluntarily sought such jurisdiction
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ @

da

Y

of

October, 1992.

10BERT A. ECHARI
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby
foregoing

certify

4

(four) true

and correct

copies of the

Brief of Respondent on Writ of Certiorari was mailed,

postage prepaid, this £ 0

day of October, 1992 to Stephen W. Jewell,

Attorney for Petitioner, 15 South Main, Third Floor, Logan, UT 84321.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Respondent
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APP. 1.

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS filed
November 22, 1991.

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-00O00 —

—•

N0V,2 2 1991

c^jfj^'x^ary T Noonan
Cterk of the Court

OPINION ^ a n ^ o u a °* A PP e a t e
(For P u b l i c a t i o n )

Carolyn Crump, nka Carolyn
Forsgren,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 900362-CA
v.
F I L E D
(November 22, 1991)

Robert Crump,
Defendant and Appellant.

First District, Cache County
The Honorable Gordon J. Low
Attorneys:

Robert A. Echard, Ogden, for Appellant
Stephen W. Jewell and Jeffrey ffR!f Burbank, Logan, for
Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Russon.
JACKSON, Judge:
Robert Crump appeals the lower court's denial of his
petition to modify a Montana court's award of joint custody to
him and Carolyn Crump, of their four children. We dismiss the
appeal.
FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Crump were granted a decree of divorce on
December 7, 1983, by a Montana district court. Prior to a
hearing on the issue of child custody, Mrs. Crump moved with the
parties' four children from Montana to Utah. In August 1985, the
Montana district court awarded Mr. Crump and Mrs. Crump joint
legal custody of the children, with primary physical custody
awarded to Mrs. Crump. In February 1989, Mr. Crump filed a
petition in Utah to modify the Montana custody decree. The
petition alleged a material change of circumstances, and urged
that Mr. Crump be awarded primary physical custody of the
children. Mr. Crump resided in Montana at the time he filed his
petition, and has been a resident of that state at all times
relevant to the present case. On April 24 and May 4 of 1990, the

trial court in Utah heard evidence and denied the petition to
modify the prior custody decree. However, the court made a
slight change in the visitation provisions and modified the child
support provisions of that decree.
Mr. Crump appeals the trial court's denial of his petition
to modify the custody order. On appeal, Mr. Crump raises three
issues, claiming: (1) the trial court committed error in applying
the standard for reviewing a petition to modify a child custody
award; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in not modifying
the award; and (3) the trial court committed error in failing to
admit certain evidence.

JURISDICTION
A threshold issue is whether or not' this court has
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. If a court lacks jurisdiction
"it has not power to entertain the suit." Curtis v. Curtis, 789
P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). Not only can
a court not entertain the suit, the parties cannot cure the
jurisdictional defect by waiver or consent. Mrs. Crump's
argument, and the dissent's assertion that because "Mr. Crump
voluntarily and affirmatively engaged the Utah courts . . . he
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to
decide the issue . . . and has thus waived any objection to the
district court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction," is
without merit. We have held that
while defects in personal jurisdiction can be
waived, subject matter jurisdiction goes to
the very power of a court to entertain an
action. A lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor
cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and
when subject matter jurisdiction does not
exist, neither the parties nor the court can
do anything to fill that void.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The issue of waiver
has been addressed by this court, see id., by our supreme court,
and by the federal courts of appeal. See, e.g., McDouqald v.
Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1484-85 (11th Cir.), cert, denied by
Jenson v. McDouqald. 479 U.S. 860, 107 S. Ct. 207 (1986) (No
waiver of jurisdictional defect in modification of child custody
case even where father had consented to jurisdiction of
Washington court, which court did not have jurisdiction); A.J*
Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah
1991) ("[A]cquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer

jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of jurisdiction can be
raised by the court or either party at any time.'1); see also
Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That Issued Previous
Custody Determination Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Or Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS S 1738A, 83 A.L.R.4th 742, 748
(1991) [hereinafter Annotation] (citation omitted) ("[S]ubject
matter jurisdiction under [the relevant child custody statutes]
cannot be vested by agreement of the parties, even though all of
the parties desire an adjudication on the merits, and such
jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by a party's
failure to interpose a timely objection to the court's assumption
of jurisdiction."). Therefore, we must determine if, under the
applicable statutes, the courts of this state have jurisdiction
to modify the Montana child custody award, and not ignore this
issue on the basis of waiver simply because Mr. Crump came to
Utah to initiate the action.
A.

Jurisdiction under the PKPA

Congress adopted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA), the jurisdictional provisions of which are codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (1989), to create a national standard that the
states could look to in interstate child custody disputes. See
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-611, § 7, (1980), 94 Stat. 3569. The PKPA was created in part
to solve problems that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) had not successfully addressed. State in Interest of
D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 128 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted).
"Where the PKPA and the state's version of the UCCJA conflict,
the PKPA preempts state law." Id. (citations omitted). Because
the PKPA "directly address the issues before this court, creates
a very manageable two-prong test for determining modification
jurisdiction, and would govern in the event of conflict with the
UCCJA or other state law," Curtis. 789 P.2d at 720, we focus our
analysis on this federal statute.
One problem that the UCCJA failed to address was a specific
provision for continuing jurisdiction. Annotation, 83 A.L.R.4th
at 748. 2 Therefore, the potential existed for concurrent
1. In the present case, the result is the same under the UCCJA
and the PKPA, although the PKPA uses language more specific than
the UCCJA in addressing jurisdiction in the modification context.
2. "However, the provisions of § 14 of the UCCJA, along with the
Commissioners' Notes to that section, have been interpreted to
(continued...)

jurisdiction between two states. Dickens, The Parental
Kidnapping Act: Application and Interpretation, 2 3 J. Fam. L.
419, 426-27 (1984-85) [hereinafter Dickens]. The PKPA eliminates
"the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction by conferring
exclusive modification jurisdiction upon the home state of the
child (i.e., the state which rendered the initial decree).'1 Id.
at 426 (citing The Effect of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980 on Child Snatching, 17 New Eng. L. Rev. 499, 511
(Spring 1982)).
Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA "anchors exclusive continuing
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original
home state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains
in that state.'1 Annotation, 83 A.L.R.4th at 748 (emphasis
added). See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 426. "While under
the UCCJA scheme some states profess to find modification
jurisdiction so long as they can properly exercise initial
custody jurisdiction, the PKPA prevents a second state from
modifying an initial state's order except in carefully
circumscribed situations."
Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476
(4th Cir. 1987). This is clear from section (f) of the PKPA
which states that
A court of a State may modify a
determination of the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if —
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a
child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no
longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined
to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1989) (emphasis added).
This section explicitly limits when a state, which would
otherwise have jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, must
defer to the state which originally issued the custody order.3
"The PKPA is a departure from the jurisdictional requirements of
the UCCJA and this departure is critical to the efficacy of the
2.
( ...continued)
establish exclusive continuing jurisdiction of the state that
made the initial custody determination." Annotation, 83
A.L.R.4th at 748.
3. Specifically the PKPA provides that states shall not modify
custody orders of another state "except as provided in subsection
(f) of this section," 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1989).

new Act because a state court may no longer modify existing
decrees of other states pursuant to the various and flexible
bases of jurisdiction provided in the UCCJA." Dickens, 23 J,
Fam. L. at 426- Further, this court has held "the language [of
the PKPA] clearly eliminates the possibility of concurrent
jurisdiction by conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the state
which rendered the initial decree[.]" State in Interest of
D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 129. See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 42627 (PKPA precludes a state court to modify existing decrees of
other states when state which issued decree maintains
jurisdiction).
In the present case, both prongs of the jurisdictional test
must be addressed. While a state may "have jurisdiction to make
such a child custody determination,] . . . " 2 8 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1989), it must decline to exercise that jurisdiction unless "the
court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination." Id.4 While Utah may have had jurisdiction to
issue the original order in this case, e.g., meeting the
requirements of subsection (1), Utah does not have jurisdiction
to modify an order from Montana because Montana has continuing
exclusive jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdiction under the UCCJA
The decision we have reached conforms with comparable
provisions of the UCCJA. The UCCJA was created to "avoid
jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other states
in matters of child custody," Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l (1987),
"promote cooperation with the courts of other states," id. ,
4. See also Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Virginia trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over
modification of custody case as Virginia had continuing and
exclusive jurisdiction); McDoucrald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1481
(11th Cir.), cert, denied by Jenson v. McDouqald, 479 U.S. 860,
107 S. Ct. 207 (1986) (no question that under PKPA, Florida, the
state which issued initial custody decree, and not Washington,
where mother and child later resided, maintained and properly
exercised jurisdiction to modify custody decree) ,• Appleqate v.
Garrt, 460 So.2d 1293, 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (Alabama court
had no jurisdiction to modify Texas custody decree where under
PKPA state issuing original decree retains exclusive
jurisdiction); Tufares v. Wright, 98 N.M. 8, 644 P.2d 522, 524
(1982) (PKPA precludea modification of Utah custody decree by New
Mexico where first prong of test was met but second prong was not
met) .

litigate custody where the child and family
have the closest connections and where
significant evidence concerning the child is
most readily available, discourage conflict
over custody, deter abductions and unilateral
removals of children, avoid relitigation of
another state's custody rulings, and promote
the exchange of information and mutual
assistance between different states[,]
State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah App. 1990)
(citing Utah Code Ann, § 78-45C-1 (1987)), or put more
succinctly, "to bring some semblance of order into the existing
chaos," Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction
and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203,
214 (1981) [hereinafter Bodenheimer] (quoting UCCJA,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 114 (1979)). All fifty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCCJA.
As to when a court in this state has jurisdiction over a
particular child custody matter, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)
(1987) provides:
A court of this state which is competent
to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in any
of the following paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of
the child at the commencement of the
proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
state within six months before commencement
of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this state because of his removal or
retention by a person claiming his custody or
for other reasons, and a parent or person
acting as parent continues to live in this
state;
(b) It is in the best interest of the
child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection
with this state, and (ii) there is available
in this state substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships;

(c) The child is physically present in
this state and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he has
been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected or dependent; or
(d)(i) It appears that no other state
would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with Paragraphs
(a), (b), or (c), or another has declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child, and (ii)
it is in the best interest of the child that
this court assume jurisdiction.
In the present case, under subsection (a), Utah is the home
state5 of the children. However, the analysis does not end at
determining whether these jurisdictional requirements are met.
Section 78-45c-14(l) (1987)6 sets forth under what circumstances
a court in Utah may modify an out-of-state custody decree:
(1) If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this state shall
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears
to the court of this state that the court
which rendered the decree does not now have
jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction.

5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2 defines "home state11 as f,the state
in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at
least six consecutive months . . . .ff
6. While this court has decided jurisdictional disputes under
the UCCJA without regard to section 14, see, e.g., Rawlinqs v.
Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988), we believe that such questions are more easily
answered by focusing on this section. See, e.g., Rawlinqs, 752
P.2d at 1330-31 (Bench, J., concurring).

(Emphasis added). 7 Under this section, both the requirements of
subsections (1)(a) and (b) must be met before Utah can modify a
decree from another state. Section 15 provides that the second
state will enforce the decree of the initial state as long as the
initial state retains custody jurisdiction. "When both states
have adopted the UCCJA, the apparent effect of §§ 14 and 15 is to
give continuing exclusive jurisdiction to the initial state as
long as that state retains a 'significant connection' basis for
jurisdiction.ff Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (4th Cir.
1987). It makes no difference that Utah may have met the
jurisdiction prerequisites of section 3; section 14 must also be
satisfied in order for this state to modify the Montana award.8
7. We note that subsection 14 contains language similar to that
found in subsection (f) of the PKPA. While it was hoped that
subsection 14 of the UCCJA would eliminate the erroneous
assumption of concurrent jurisdiction, it proved to be an
imperfect remedy. Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir.
1987); Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214. "While under the UCCJA
scheme some states profess to find modification jurisdiction so
long as they can properly exercise initial custody jurisdiction,
the PKPA prevents a second state from modifying an initial
state's order . . . ." Meade, 812 F.2d at 1476.
8. To read section 3 of the UCCJA, which merely addresses under
what circumstances a state may have jurisdiction, without the
qualifying language of section 14, as the dissent would have us
do, is to ignore the plain language of the Act. Scholars
addressing this very issue have commented that prior to the
UCCJA, "concurrent jurisdiction in several states to modify an
existing custody judgment was a major cause of parental resort to
kidnapping to gain a more favorable judgment in a new forum.,f
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 213-14. Therefore, section 14 is
the key provision to carry out the UCCJA's objective of
preventing jurisdictional conflict. Ld. at 214. This is
especially true, when as here, the question is not simply, does a
particular state have jurisdiction to make a custody decree, but,
does a particular state have jurisdiction to modify an existing
custody decree of another state.
While section 14 was overlooked by early cases under the
UCCJA, see, e.g..
Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218, 526
P.2d 658 (1974), and Howard v. Gish, 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d
1280 (1977), the majority of states, including Utah, now
recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of the state which issued
the original decree. See, e.g., State in Interest of D.S.K., 792
P.2d at 128; Curtis, 789 P.2d at 724-25; Rawlinqs v. Weinerf 752
P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). The dissent however, chooses
(continued...)

It is clear that in the case at bar, the requirement of
subsection (l)(a) is not met.
[T]he continuing jurisdiction of the prior
court is exclusive. Other states do not have
jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must
respect and defer to the prior state's
continuing jurisdiction.

Exclusive continuing jurisdiction
is not affected by the child's residence in
another state for six months or more.
Although the new state becomes the child's
home state, significant connection
jurisdiction continues in the state of the
prior decree where the court record and other
evidence exists and where one parent or
another contestant continues to reside. Only
when the child and all parties have moved
away is deference to another state's
continuing jurisdiction no longer reguired.
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214-15 (quoted in State in Interest
of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124) (emphasis added). See also Rawlings
v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J.,
concurring), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). ,fAs long
as the decree state retains jurisdiction there is no concurrent
jurisdiction to modify a decree under the UCCJA," State in
Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124 (citations omitted), and "as
long as one parent continues to reside in the original state and
maintains some contact with the child . . . [ , ] " id. at 125,
jurisdiction remains in the decree state.
Mrs. Crump's argument that jurisdiction automatically
shifted to Utah, the new home state, when she and the children
moved there, is without merit. Mr. Crump continues to reside in
Montana, where the original custody decree was issued. Montana
has not relinquished jurisdiction, nor have the parties sought to
have Montana do so. Instead, Mr. Crump chose to petition the

8. (•..continued)
to ignore Utah case law, and relies instead upon cases from
Indiana and Illinois to make the point that concurrent
jurisdiction does exist.

courts of Utah for a modification of custody.
Therefore, under
the UCCJA, Montana has continuing exclusive jurisdiction and has
not declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this case.
CONCLUSION
While there is much confusion as to the applicability of the
UCCJA and the PKPA in child custody modification proceedings,
this is no excuse for counsel in these types of cases to totally
ignore the law. In the present case, we have no choice but to
dismiss the appeal because the courts of Utah do not have
jurisdiction to modify the Montana decree. The dissent is
disturbed that this result might require further proceedings.
However, if the proper procedures had been followed at the
outset, the dissent would have no basis for its complaint.
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify Montana's
custody decree, we dismiss the appeal.

RUSSON, Judge (dissenting):
I dissent. In my opinion, the Utah District Court did
have jurisdiction in this matter and, further, had a right to
exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody

9. The dissent correctly points out that had the !fstay-at-home
parent, of his or her own volition, moved from Montana, Utah
would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction." However, it
does not follow that "had the stay-at-home parent, of his or her
own volition, never asserted his or her custody rights in
Montana, Utah would also be able to exercise its jurisdiction."

Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)1 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA)•
The majority opinion fails to adhere to the plain and
unambiguous language of the UCCJA and the PKPA, as well as to
their spirit and purpose, in its erroneous determination that the
Utah District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the
matter that was before it.2
I.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the UCCJA, there was constant conflict between
custody orders of states having concurrent jurisdiction. This
usually occurred when one parent moved from the state which
granted the divorce to a different state, and then filed an
action in the second state for custody of the minor children.
Where the children were present with that parent, either by
visitation or by having been taken there, that state naturally
had jurisdiction to deal with their custody. If the decree
entered was contrary to the decree of the original forum state,
then the parties (and the courts) were faced with the problem of
conflicting orders.

II.

JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJA
A. Section 3 of the UCCJA3

To solve this problem, the UCCJA was proposed and has now
been adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
It specifically recognizes that two states may have simultaneous

1. In Utah, the UCCJA is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-l
to -26 (1987 and Supp. 1991). At all times relevant to this
case, the statutory language found in the 1987 version of the
statute governs. For the sake of consistency and clarity, all
sections of the UCCJA are cross-referenced to the corresponding
sections as set forth therein.
2. In order to properly understand the state and federal
responses to conflicts between states having concurrent
jurisdiction, one must be aware that the UCCJA was first proposed
in August 1968, while Congress did not enact the PKPA until
December 1980. Accordingly, these two documents will be
addressed chronologically.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987).

concurrent jurisdiction, but directs how such jurisdiction shall
be exercised:
(1) A court of this state which is
competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in any
of the following paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the
home state of the child at the time
of commencement of the proceeding,
or (ii) had been the child's home
state within six months before
commencement of the proceeding and
the child is absent from this state
because of his removal or retention
by a person claiming his custody or
for other reasons, and a parent or
person acting as parent continues
to live in this state;
(b) It is in the best
interest of the child that a court
of this state assume jurisdiction
because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least
one contestant, have a significant
connection with this state, and
(ii) there is available in this
state substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships;
(c) The child is physically
present in this state, and (i) the
child has been abandoned or (ii) it
is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has
been subjected to or threatened
with mistreatment or abuse or is
otherwise neglected or dependent;
or
(d) (i) It appears that no
other state would have jurisdiction
under prerequisites substantially
in accordance with Paragraphs (a),
(b), or (c), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that this state is
the more appropriate forum to

determine the custody of the child,
and (ii) it is in the best interest
of the child that this court assume
jurisdiction,,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987) (emphasis added).
"Home state" is defined by the UCCJA to mean:
the state in which the child immediately
preceding the time involved lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as
parent, for at least six consecutive months,
and in the case of a child less than six
months old the state in which the child lived
from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2(5) (1987).
The operation of section 34 was explained by the drafters
of the UCCJA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, as follows:
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection
(a) establish the two major bases for
jurisdiction. In the first place, a court in
the child's home state has jurisdiction, and
secondly, if there is no home state or the
child and his family have equal or stronger
ties with another state, a court in that
state has jurisdiction. If this alternative
test produces concurrent jurisdiction in more
than one state, the mechanisms provided in
sections 66 and 7 7 are used to assure that
only one state makes the custody decision.
5

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i), (ii) (1987)

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6 (1987).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7 (1987).

Paragraph (2) comes into play either
when the home state test cannot be met or as
an alternative to that test. The first
situation arises, for example, when a family
has moved frequently and there is no state
where the child has lived for 6 months prior
to suit, or if the child has recently been
removed from his home state and the person
who was left behind has also moved away. See
paragraph (1), 9 last clause. A typical
example of alternative jurisdiction is the
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses
to follow the departed spouse to state 2
(where the child has lived for several months
with the other parent) and starts proceedings
there.
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Comment at 20-21 (1968)
(emphasis added) (hereinafter Comment).
Thus, the plain language of section 310 and the comments
thereto provide that State Two has jurisdiction if it meets one
of the bases established in that section.
B. Other Sections of the UCCJA
Moreover, if Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987) is construed
otherwise, the remaining sections of the UCCJA fail to make sense
wherein they require that State Two shall stay proceedings if the
matter is pending in another state, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(3)
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the first
state is a more appropriate forum, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the
petitioner is guilty of improper conduct, Utah Code Ann. § 7845c-8(l) (1987); and shall not exercise rts jurisdiction to
modify unless the interest of the child necessitates, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45c-8(2) (1987). All of the foregoing are indicia of
jurisdiction: If a court does not have jurisdiction, it does not
have the power to stay proceedings, nor the power to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction, nor the power to proceed with the
proceedings even if to do so would be in the best interest of the
children's safety and well being. It would have no choice but to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
8.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(ii)

9.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i)

10.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3

(1987).
(1987).

(1987).

However, a court does have these choices because the UCCJA
specifically confers jurisdiction on the second state where the
child and a parent have been living for at least six consecutive
months (home state), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1) (a) (1987); or
when it is in the best interest of the child to assume
jurisdiction because the child and at least one parent have a
significant connection with the second state and there is
substantive evidence in that state pertaining to the child's
care, protection, training and personal relationships, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45c-3(1)(b) (1987); or in the case of an emergency,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3(1)(c) (1987); or when no other state
has jurisdiction or another state has declined to exercise
jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(1) (d) (1987).
C. Utah Cases
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Tuttle v. Henderson, 628
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1981) offers additional insight into the issue of
concurrent jurisdiction under the UCCJA. In that case, the trial
court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction, but refused to
exercise it under the circumstances of that case. IdL at 1276.
Although Tuttle is a pre-UCCJA case, the court quoted extensively
from the UCCJA and found that the UCCJA provided persuasive
authority to support its affirmance of the trial court's holding
that it had concurrent jurisdiction. id. at 1276-77.
Also instructive is the Utah Supreme Court's holding in
Coppedge v/Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985), a post-UCCJA
case. In that case, an action was filed by the Coppedges in
Oregon, to make them guardians of their grandson, who was living
with them in Oregon. In response, a custody action by the
child's parents was subsequently filed in Utah. The Utah Supreme
Court ordered the district court "to stay the Utah action to the
extent that it seeks to determine custody under the Uniform Act"
and "to communicate with the Oregon Court . . . to determine the
propriety of further proceedings in Oregon." Id. at 1122. The
district court was further instructed that "[i]n the event that
the Oregon court stays its proceedings after such communication,
then the Utah court may proceed to adjudicate the custody
matter." Id. If Utah did not have jurisdiction, then the
district court could not have been ordered to stay its
proceedings nor to proceed after communicating with Oregon. On
the other hand, if Oregon did not have jurisdiction, then the
Utah Supreme Court would have simply concluded such and ordered
the district court to proceed. The only conclusion that can be
drawn from this case is the existence of concurrent jurisdiction.
See also State in Interest of W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011, 1013
(Utah App. 1989) (under the facts of that case, Utah and
California had concurrent jurisdiction); Rawlings v. Weiner, 752
P.2d 1327, 1331 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring) (under the

facts of that case, Utah had primary jurisdiction and Washington
had secondary jurisdiction), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1988) .
III.

EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Once the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA have been
met, our inquiry then turns to the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Just because a state has jurisdiction does not mean that it can
exercise it as to custody. State Two "shall not exercise its
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition
a proceeding concerning custody of the child was pending in a
court of another state exercising jurisdiction . . . . If Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(l) (1987). In such case, State Two ,fshall
stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be
litigated in the more appropriate forum . . . .ff Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45c-6(3) (1987). Secondly, a court may decline to exercise
its jurisdiction if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(l) (1987). Thirdly, where State Two
has jurisdiction, it generally cannot modify the custody decree
of State One unless it appears to the court of State Two that
State One "does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
requirements substantially in accordance with [the UCCJA] or has
declined to assume jurisdiction[.]ff Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c14(1) (a) (1987).11 Thus, even if jurisdiction is established
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c6, - 7 , and -14 (1987) govern the exercise of that jurisdiction.
However, if both parents and the children move from the
state of the original decree, deference to that state's
jurisdiction is no longer required. State in Interest of D.S.K.,
792 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Bodenheimer,
Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981)).
As the drafters' comment to section 14 12 states:

11. State Two may nonetheless proceed with matters other than
custody. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(6) (1987),
ft
[t]he court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this
act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for
divorce on another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over
the divorce or other proceedings.11
12.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-14 (1987).

Courts which render a custody decree
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to
modify the decree under local law. Courts in
other states have in the past often assumed
jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state
decree themselves without regard to the
preexisting jurisdiction of the other state.
See People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947). In order to
achieve greater stability of custody
arrangements and avoid forum shopping,
subsection (a) declares that other states
will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of
the court of another state as long as that
state has jurisdiction under the standards of
the Act. In other words, all petitions for
modification are to be addressed to the prior
state if that state has sufficient contact
with the case to satisfy section 3.13 The
fact that the court had previously considered
the case may be one factor favoring its
continued jurisdiction. If, however, all the
persons involved have moved away or the
contact with the state has otherwise become
slight, modification jurisdiction would shift
elsewhere. Compare Ratner, Child Custody in
a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 82122 (1964).
For example, if custody was awarded to
the father in state 1 where he continued to
live with the children for two years and
thereafter his wife kept the children in
state 2 for 6-1/2 months (3-1/2 months beyond
her visitation privileges) with or without
permission of the husband, state 1 has
preferred jurisdiction to modify the decree
despite the fact that state 2 has in the
meantime become the "home state" of the
child. If, however, the father also moved
away from state 1, that state loses
modification jurisdiction interstate, whether
or not its jurisdiction continues under local
law. See Clark, Domestic Relations 322-23
(1968) .
Comment at 32.
13.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3

(1987).

Additionally, if the stay-at-home parent fails to assert his
or her custody rights, then State One's jurisdiction ceases:
[I]f the father in the same case continued to
live in state 1, but let his wife keep the
children for several years without asserting
his custody rights and without visits of
the children in state 1, modification
jurisdiction of state 1 would cease. Compare
Brenqle v. Hurst, 408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966).
Id.
IV.

APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, there is no
question but that the Utah District Court has jurisdiction under
the plain language of the UCCJA. Utah is the home state of the
children because they have lived here with their mother for over
two years, substantially longer than the six months required by
the UCCJA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a) (1987).
Furthermore, the children and Mrs. Crump have significant
connection with Utah and substantial evidence exists in Utah
concerning their training, care, protection and personal
relationships. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-l(1)(c), -3(b)
(1987). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
[appellate courts] will not look beyond to divine legislative
intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should
be construed according to its plain language.'1 Allisen v.
American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988)
(citation omitted). Thus, we should hold that according to the
plain language of section 78-45c-3, the Utah district court and
this court have jurisdiction to hear this case.
Furthermore, although Mr. Crump has continued to live in
Montana, he came to Utah, docketed the Montana judgment in Utah,
petitioned the Utah Court to modify the Montana decree, and then
appealed that judgment to this court. The Utah District Court
had before it the children and mother who had lived in Utah for
over two years, and the father who petitioned the Utah court
seeking to modify the Montana custody decree. Such a scenario
was the subject of the drafters' comment to section 3, K wherein
it stated: ffA typical example of alternative jurisdiction is the
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses to follow the
departed spouse to state 2 (where the child has lived for several
months with the other parent) and starts proceedings there."
14.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3

(1987).

Comment at 21. That is exactly what we have in this case: Mr.
Crump (stay-at-home parent) chose to follow Mrs. Crump (departed
spouse) to Utah (where the children have lived for over two years
with their mother) and commence proceedings in Utah. This offers
further support for concluding that the district court had
jurisdiction to hear this case.
Having found that the jurisdictional requirements of the
UCCJA have been met, our inquiry turns to whether or not the Utah
court could exercise its jurisdiction. As noted above, if Mr.
Crump had, of his own volition, moved from Montana, Utah would
then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. Also, if Mr. Crump,
of his own volition, had never asserted his custody rights in
Montana, Utah would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction.
The question which remains for us is whether Utah should be able
to exercise its jurisdiction when Mr. Crump, of his own volition,
chooses to follow Mrs. Crump to Utah and bring suit here.
This very question was answered i^ Williams v. Williams, 555
N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1990).15 In that case, the father lived in
Indiana with one child and the mother lived in Illinois with the
other child. She filed a petition in Indiana for custody of both
children. The Indiana court awarded custody of both children to
the father. The mother appealed, and the Indiana Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that because Illinois

was the home state of the one child,

Indiana

lacked

jurisdiction

under the UCCJA to deal with custody.
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the court of appeals,
stating:
Once a court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the general class or
kind of case, its specific jurisdiction over
a particular case within the general class is
subject to waiver. In fState ex rel. Hight
v. Marion Superior Court, 547 N.E.2d 267, 270
(Ind. 1989)] we observed:
Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-3(a)
and (b) empower a trial court to
hear causes of action for
dissolution and for child support.
15. Although Williams concerns an initial custody determination,
rather than modification of custody, it is nonetheless persuasive
because the UCCJA establishes the same jurisdictional standards
for child custody determinations by initial or modification
decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l) (1987).

Within this grant of subject matter
jurisdiction is the power to
determine child support. (Ind.
Code § 31-1-11.5-12), child custody
(Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-20), and
visitation (Ind. Code § 31-1-11.524). By filing the dissolution
action, [the wife] engaged the
trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction to hear dissolution
cases, which includes the authority
to decide issues of child support
and visitation.

Resolution of the subject matter
jurisdiction issue involves determining
whether the claim advanced falls within the
general scope of authority conferred upon the
court by the constitution or statute. The
authority to hear child custody cases is not
directly granted by the UCCJA. Rather, Sec.
3(a) merely operates to restrict the existing
power of courts to hear custody cases. Ind.
Code § 31-1-11.6-3(a) begins:
A court of this state which is
competent to decide child custody
matters has jurisdiction to make
child custody determination by
initial remodification decree if:
[emphasis added]
The source of this competency to decide child
custody matters is found in Ind. Code § 31-111.5-20 and is an incidental grant of
specific authority within the general grant
of subject matter jurisdiction to hear
actions for dissolution and child support.
The jurisdictional limitations imposed by the
UCCJA are not equivalent to declarations of
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather are
refinements of the ancillary capacity of a
trial court to exercise authority over a
particular case. This exercise of authority
is waivable.

Because of the voluntary conduct of
Bonnie in affirmatively engaging the Indiana
courts to determine custody, and expressly
consenting to the trial court's authority to
determine custody, we find that she has
waived any guestion regarding the authority
of the court to decide the issue of custody
under the facts of her case and has thus
waived the trial court's jurisdiction over
her particular case.
Id. at 144-45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Also persuasive is the Indiana Court of Appeals' holding in
Schneider v. Schneider, 555 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. App. 1990). In
circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, the court held
that under the UCCJA, Indiana had jurisdiction to modify a
Wisconsin custody decree because the stay-at-home parent
"voluntarily submitted himself to the trial court's
jurisdiction,11 Id. at 199, thereby raising an inference that the
parties considered Indiana to be the more appropriate forum. Id.
In the present case, this court raised sua sponte an
objection to jurisdiction, and now bases its decision on a lack
thereof. Instead, we should infer from Mr. Crump's decision to
come to Utah, docket the Montana judgment here, petition the Utah
Court to modify the Montana decree, and then appeal that judgment
to this court, that the parties before us consider Utah the more
appropriate forum in which to litigate this action. See also In
re Marriage of Slate, 536 N.E.2d 894 (111. App. 1989) ("Under the
UCCJA, jurisdiction refers not to the due process limitations of
potential subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but instead to
the legislature's discretionary limitation upon the exercise of
existing jurisdiction. Thus the Act permits some discretion in
the trial court's determination of its jurisdiction to ensure
that jurisdiction takes place in the forum where the ties between
the State and the child and his family are the closest." Id. at
896 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); In Re Marriage of
Weinstein, 408 N.E.2d 952 (111. App. 1980) ("[WJhere both
prospective custodians are present in a state and there is an
opportunity for a full hearing on the custody issue, the
jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Act may be satisfied."
Id. at 956 (citing Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1229 (1969)).
In our case, the district court was competent to decide
child custody matters under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp.
1991) ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution
and not prohibited by law."); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(1) (1989)

("Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided
by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided by
this chapter. 11 ); and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(5)(d) (1989) ("In
all actions the court and the judge have jurisdiction over . . .
the custody and maintenance of minor children[.]"). See also
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. Moreover, Utah has jurisdiction to
make child custody determinations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3
(1987). Since Mr. Crump voluntarily and affirmatively engaged
the Utah courts to modify the Montana decree, in doing so he
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to
decide the issue under the facts of this case and has thus waived
any objection to the district court's authority to exercise its
jurisdiction over this particular case.
Furthermore, the majority opinion misconstrues the plain
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) in reaching its
erroneous conclusion that the said section strips Utah courts of
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides:
If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this state shall
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears
to the court of this state that the court
which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction.
The plain language of this section recognizes that both states
can have concurrent jurisdiction: Montana has jurisdiction
because it made the custody decree, and unless Utah also has
jurisdiction under another section of the act, subsection (b)
above is meaningless. Thus, it is clear that this section does
not contain qualifying language that strips Utah courts of
jurisdiction, but instead addresses the exercise of that
jurisdiction.16
Although the majority opinion correctly states that
acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court, such is inapplicable here. The
parties are not purporting to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah
16. Additionally, it should be noted that the Utah district
court did not modify the Montana decree as to custody. While the
Utah court had jurisdiction to modify the Montana custody decree,
it chose not to because there had not been a substantial change
of circumstances.

courts. As shown above, Utah already had jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987), By coming to Utah, docketing the
Montana judgment here, petitioning the Utah District Court to
modify the Montana custody decree, and appealing that judgment to
this court, Mr. Crump did not purport to waive Montana's
jurisdiction, but simply waived any objection to Utah's authority
to exercise its jurisdiction.
V. JURISDICTION UNDER THE
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
Nor is Utah's jurisdiction prohibited under the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991). In fact,
both the plain language of the statute and its spirit and
purposes support the conclusion that Utah has jurisdiction.
Subsection (f) of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991) contains language
similar to that found in Utah Code Ann. 78-45c-14(1) (1987). 17
Subsection (f) provides:
A court of a State may modify a
determination of the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if -(1) it has jurisdiction to
make such a child custody
determi nation; and
(2) the court of the other
state no longer has jurisdiction,
or it has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction to modily such
determination.
As is the case with section 78-45c-14, this section does not
strip Utah courts of jurisdiction, but merely addresses the
exercise of that jurisdiction. The majority opinion acknowledges
as much wherein it states that the jurisdictional prerequisites
17.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides:
If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this state shall
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears
to the court of this state that the court
which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction.

of subsection (1) have been met. Nonetheless, the majority
opinion then seems to contradict itself by reaching the
conclusion that despite the fact that subsection (1) has been
met, the Utah courts do not have jurisdiction.
Secondly, an examination of the purposes of the act support
Utah assuming jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case.
Those purposes include: (1) deterring interstate abductions,
(2) determination of custody by the state which can best decide
the case in the interest of the child, (3) facilitating the
enforcement of custody decrees of sister states, and (4)
promotion of greater stability of home environment. See
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No,
96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980). First, the case at bar does
not concern a parent that has abducted a child and moved
elsewhere to find a more favorable forum. Instead, we have a
very different scenario in which the stay-at-home parent has
affirmatively chosen to follow the departed spouse to the home
state of the children and bring suit there. Secondly, as
discussed above, since Mrs. Crump and the children have lived in
Utah for over two years, Utah is in the best position to decide
the case in the interest of the children. Thirdly, since the
Utah District Court did not modify the custody portion of the
Montana decree, its decision does facilitate enforcement of that
decree. Lastly, rather than promoting greater stability of home
environment, the majority opinion instead promotes the excessive
litigation that the act was created to curb.

VI.

CONCLUSION

I would hold that the trial court had jurisdiction, as
well as the right to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter.
Accordingly, I would hold that this court has jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, and that the matter should proceed on appeal.18

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

18. While the result in this case in no way compels either party
to petition for certiorari in Utah, or modification in Montana,
resolution of this controversy may require such. This
possibility is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that
the children have already appeared twice before judges in two
states.

APP. 2.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE JUDGE
ROBERT M. HOLTER

1

AFTERNOON SESSION, THURSDAY, JUNE 6, 1985.

2

(Whereupon, the proceedings were convened

3

in Chambers with only the Judge and children present,

4

and the following proceedings were had:)

5

THE COURT:

6

RONNIE:

7

THE COURT:

What's your name?

Ronnie.
Can. I put my name on

8

there?

9

right on there so you know who I am, and I'll put

Okay.

How about that.

I'li just put my name

10

something like that kind of a symbol.

11

we use a symbol like that, and that's a -- that means

12

that one of our children has been there.

13

supposed to be a cat.
RONNIE:

14

In our family

That's

How'd you do that?
I went fishing.

I put my

15

pole down' and I was going up to talk to Jamie and I

16

was coming up and I -- coming up and it was sort of

17

steep and I slipped and hit a rock, rolled down hit

18

another rock, and I -- and another rock came and hit

19

my leg.
THE COURT:

20
21

Does it hurt?

Does it

hurt today?

22

RONNIE:

23

THE COURT:

A little bit
You know what?

24

both of my legs at one time or another

25

and they hurt, don't they?
TAT BY MARSHALL

Okay.
AND

I broke

in my life,

Now we have to do

MARSHALL

1

this, we have to get all your names.

2

BRET : I 'm Bret .

3

THE COURT:

4

sign your own name?

Now you're Bret. Can you

I'll bet I can guess your name.

5

BRET:

Scotty.

6

THE COURT:

7

And your Rob, and Ronnie.

8

talked to already because Ronnie's got a bum leg

9

today.

10

BRET:

11 I

THE COURT:

12

right.

Oh, you went and told me.
And Ronnie we know we

No, a broken one.
Well, it will be all

It will get all healed up, won't it?

13 I fellows know where you're at?
14

This lady's taking

down what we say so -- I guess we didn't show you

15 [that.

You guys have got to come over and take a look

16

at that.

17

something.

18

quiet for a minute and then you say "I'm

That machine works when somebody says
When you said, "I'm Bret" -- we'll all be

19

BRET:

20

THE COURT:

21

Rob, how long you been in

Montana this time?
ROBBIE:

23

THE COURT:

25

Bret."

I'm Bret.

22

24

Now you

About a week.
About a week.

And are you

all done with school this year?
ROBBIE:

We got done this Friday.

PAT RY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL

1
2

THE COURT:
have there, some

jawbreakers

3

ROBBIE:

4

THE COURT:

5

bubble

7

THE COURT:
some bubble

9

gum,

rid of theirs

THE COURT:
like living

down

16

BRET:

And

Bret

and

Scotty

got

get

any.

Oh, you poor

guy.

How

do

Terrible.
I do too.

I feel

really

terrible .

18

ROBBIE:
gonna move

up here.

20

It's not very

I hate

THE COURT:
anyway?

Who

told you
ROBBIE:

23

THE COURT:
that

it down

fun, but

in

You'd move

we're

Utah.
up

here

that?

22

25

about you Ronnie, you

in Utah?

ROBBIE:

24

How

No, I didn't

15

21

the

already.

13

19

did you get

Yes.

BRET:

17

Where

THE COURT:

you

gum.

too?

12

14

gum?

Downstairs.

RONNIE:

10
11

do you

gum?
ROBBIE:

got

What

or some bubble

Bubble

6

8

Last Friday.

Mom.
She did, huh.

happen?
ROBBIE:

A while

^ T T » T T

*

Mr\

ago.

U A H C U A T

T

When

did

1
2

THE COURT:

does Scotty like to live at?

3
4

SCOTTY:

Me?

THE COURT:
Montana.

You like to live in

Are you a cowboy?

7

SCOTTY:

8

THE COURT:

9

SCOTTY:

10
11

I like to live up here

in Montana best.

5
6

How about Scotty, where

Yes.
You ride a horse?

Yeah.

THE COURT:

Now, Bret, what kind of

shoes do you call those?

12

BRET:

13

THE COURT:

Shiney ones.
You like shiney shoes.

14

Why do you like to live in Montana better 'than you d

15

in Utah, Bret?

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

BRET:

Because I don't feel very

better in Utah
THE COURT:

You get along, Bret, well

with your mommy?
BRET:

I feel terrible with her.

I

feel terrible with her.
THE COURT:
with your mommy, Rob?

And how do you get along

Do you get along with her?

24

ROBBIE :

25

THE COURT:

Oh, yes .
Do you get along well wit

CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL

1

your daddy?
ROBBIE:

2

Sort of.

THE COURT:
ROBBIE:

What do you mean by that?

I don't see him very much.

THE COURT:
6

with him when you see him?

7

ROBBIE:

8

THE COURT:

9

ROBBIE:

Yes

No,

ROBBIE:

13

THE COURT:

No.

BRET:

16

THE COURT:

His name's Ronnie.

RONNIE :

19

THE COURT:

20

RONNIE:

21

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
How about your daddy?

I get along with him, too.
You like your daddy's

farm?

23

RONNIE :

24

THE COURT:

25

Do you get along well with

your mother?

18

22

How about you Robbie, you

get along well with your daddy?

15

17

Your mommy ever mean to

you?

12

14

Is he ever mean to you?

THE COURT:

10
11

Well/ do you get along

there of your own?

Yeah.
Have you got a cow out

What's her name?

PAT RY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL

1

RONNIE:

2

THE COURT:

3

Twinky.
How'd you do in school

this year.

4

RONNIE:

5

THE COURT:

6

RONNIE:

I made third.

7

ROBBIE:

I made fourth, but I didn't

8

THE COURT:

ROBBIE:

12

THE COURT:

ROBBIE:

15

hard.

16

half hour.

A lot of stuff that's too

THE COURT:

Oh, well, how big are the

ass ignments ?

19

ROBBIE:

Paper about that size.

About

like this big sheet of paper.
THE COURT:

21
22

What do you have to do in

Like I gotta get three assignments done in a

17

20

Because it's too hard.

school?

14

18

Why didn't you like

school, Rob?

11

13

You passed?

like school at all.

9
10

Good.

You don't go to school, do

you?

23

SCOTTY:

24

THE COURT:

25

SCOTTY:

I do too.
Do you go to kindergarden

Uh-huh, kindergarden.

CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL
« r r^nor

r

c

DDT q D M .

MONTANA

THE COURT:
2

What

do you do in

kindergarden?

3

SCOTTY:

We play

4

THE COURT:
guy, aren't you?

Bret, you're

kind

of an

Well now, I'll

tell

you

5

active

6

what, you guys can go now.

7

BRET:

8

THE COURT:

9

will you

leave

hall.

Is there

11

Ronnie

and Robbie

12

You didn't

somebody

proceedings

to talk

stay here.

THE COURT:

15

your

16

daddy

about

your

and

to out

Okay.

Scotty,
in the

there?

See you

left

the

Now, have you

-- where

out

you're

And

guys.

a brief pause

while Bret and Scotty

14

to me.

You go back

(Whereupon, there was

13

talk

W e l l , Bret

for a minute.

10

around.

in the

room.)

talked

gonna

to

live

next

year .
i

17

ROBBIE:

18

THE COURT:

19

mommy

about

20
21
22

about

(child

THE COURT:

talked

to your

What

nodded).
did your

mommy

say

it?

23

ROBBIE:

24

THE COURT:

25

Have you

it?
ROBBIE:

I

No.

[are going

She don't

know.

She doesn't

to do.
CAT BY MARSHALL

AND

MARSHALL

know what

you

1

ROBBIE:

2

Just as long as we get out of

the place we're at.

3

THE COURT:

4

You mean she doesn't like

to live where your living either?

5

ROBBIE:

No, because we're living in

6

one part of a house and it's just -- it's a normal

7

house, but it's got two places in it —

8

And the walls are like paper.

9

right through the wall.

10

two stories.

You talk and it goes

You can hear the neighbors

talk whenever you want to.

11 J

THE COURT:

So that's why you want to

12 imove back to Montana?
13

ROBBIE:

(child nodded).

14 I

THE COURT:

And your mommy said she's

15 Igoing to move back to Montana?
16

ROBBIE:

17

THE COURT:

18

trailer.

19
20

Yeah, if we get a trailer.

Where would you put that?
ROBBIE:

Out back of Grandpa's

garden .

21

THE COURT:

22

ROBBIE:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Oh, you're going to get a

Which grandpa is that?

Holyoak.
Do you have a lot of

friends around St. Ignatius?
ROBBIE:

Uh-huh.

CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL

1

THE COURT:

2

ROBBIE:

Some of your

schoolmates?

Well, I can't remember

any

3

schoolmates, because I haven't went to school up here

4

for two years.

5

THE COURT:

I see.

How about you,

6

Ronnie, can you remember some of your

7

here?
RONNIE:

What's

some of their

names ?

11

RONNIE:

12

THE C O U R T :

13

the doctor

14

leg

in that

Sam, he's my best

tell you you're gonna have

Four w e e k s .

16

RONNIE:

I have to have

two w e e k s , and then

18
19

21

RONNIE:

O h , that's
yet?

Yeah, my grandpa

got me a

pai r .

22

THE C O U R T :

23

RONNIE:

24

THE C O U R T :

25

cast.

O h , do you?

Have you got a pair of crutches

20

your

this one on

I get a walking

THE C O U R T :
good.

to have

cast?
ROBBIE:

for

friend.

Now, tell me how long did

15

17

from

Uh-huh.

THE C O U R T :
10

friends

Can you walk

Tomorrow

on them?

I can.

Which grandpa

crutches ?

CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL

got you the

1

ROBBIE:

2

THE COURT:

3

your other

Holyoak.

grandparents?

4

RONNIE:

5

THE COURT:

6

Pretty good.

RONNIE:

8

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

RONNIE:

11

THE COURT:

12

ROBBIE:

13

THE COURT:

No.
Do you like to work/ Rob?

Yes.
What do you do out there

on the farm with your dad?

15

ROBBIE:

16

THE COURT:

17

the summer at the farm --

Mess around with cows.

18

ROBBIE:

19

THE COURT:

20

Does he make you work

pretty hard?

10

14

You like to help your dad

out on the farm?

7

9

How do you get along with

spend

Would you like to spend

Yes.
-- or would you

rather

it in Utah?

21

ROBBIE:

22

THE COURT:

23

ROBBIE:

24

THE COURT:

25

daddy were here, you'd like that better?

Here.
You'd rather be here?

Uh-huh.
If both your mommy and

CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL

ROBBIE:

Yes.

2

THE COURT:

3

RONNIE:

4

THE C O U R T :

5

the summer

I don't

RONNIE:

I'd

THE COURT:

9

RONNIE:
It's

THE COURT:
while

14

THE COURT:

15

as your

16

grandparents

it in Saint

grandparents

You

THE COURT:

19

ROBBIE:
that

just

to lift

it.

long

come

up a little

ago?

Will you tell me, as far

do you gee along with

18

the

one of your

best?

Holyoak.
Why

do you say

Because

I don'z

that?

see

Grandpa

seen

Grandpa

-- enough.
THE COURT:

Crump

trying

are concerned, which

ROBBIE:

21

just

hurting?

Uh-huh.

17

Crump

Is your leg

ago, just a few minutes
RONNIE:

22

Utah?

like to spend

I'm

13

20

spend

heavy.

11
12

in

to

Ignatius.

8

10

Ronnie?

know.

Would you like

in St. Ignatius or

6
7

How about you,

for a long

time.

Would

23

ROBBIE:

24

THE COURT:

25

ROBBIE:

•» Y> #*• TY *

You

haven't
you like

to see

No.
Why

not?

I'm having

r

r

x

>TT-N

fun over

x i K r > O t l A T T

at

him?

Jamie f s house.
THE COURT:
ROBBIE:

At Jamie's house?

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

Well, do you have fun when

you go over to your daddy's house?
ROBBIE:

Yes•

THE COURT:

That's where you grew up,

wasn't it ?
ROBBIE:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Do you have your own room

there?
ROBBIE:
that

Yes.

I have to share it with

(child indicating) when we're over there

though.
THE COURT:

You two share a room.

That's a lot better than getting Scotty and Bret in
there , isn ' t it ?
ROBBIE:

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

I bet they're little

—

wild little apes, aren't they?
ROBBIE:

I bet you couldn't even go to

bed with them over there jumping around.
sudden you fall asleep and get up.

All of a

I always have to

stay awake until they go to sleep, then I go to
sleep, then I have to get up.
CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL

THE COURT:
ROBBIE:

2

Bret's the noisy one?

Scotty's the noisy one, too.

3

Scotty goes to sleep real fast.

4

Mom's

room.

5
6

THE COURT:

ROBBIE:

8

THE COURT:

11

THE COURT:

12

ROBBIE:

13

THE COURT:

You boys go to church?

Uh-huh.
Who do you go to to church

with?
ROBBIE:

16

THE COURT:

Lots of people.
Lots of people.

Can you

name some of them?

18

ROBBIE:

19

THE COURT:

Dad and Mom.
Daddy takes you to

chu rch?

21

ROBBIE:

22

THE COURT:

23

Tell the

No.

15

20

Are you quiet?

truth
ROBBIE:

17

really

No.

10

14

I bet Ronnie's

quiet, isn't he?

7

9

He goes to sleep in

Yes.
Do you like to go with

him?

24

ROBBIE:

25

THE COURT:
TAT

RV

Yes.
You like to go with your

MARSHAT.T. AMn

MARfiHATJ,

mother?
ROBBIE:

Yes.

3

THE COURT:

4

me that we haven't talked about, Ronnie?

5

RONNIE:

6

THE COURT:

7

Anything you want to tell

No.
This kind of makes you

boys confused, does it?

8

ROBBIE:

9

THE COURT:

Yes.
I bet it does.

Well,

10

we'll try to do something and we'll see what we can

11

do.

12

least.

And you'll be -- probably be here for awhile at
Is that okay with you?

13

ROBBIE:

14

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
Good.

Then you're going

15

to move b.ack up to Montana from Utah anyway, you

16

said?

17

ROBBIE:

18

THE COURT:

19

being here.

20

have -- who was

Yes.

out

there

that

ROBBIE:

22

THE COURT:

23

ROBBIE:

25

Well, thank you for

Now I can't lift Ronnie, and so I'll

21

24

Okay.

brought

Grandpa.

you

in?

I can take him.

He's a little too big.

No he's not.

He is a year

and a half younger than me.
THE COURT:

We can't let you drop

CAT BY MARSHALL AND MARSHALL
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him.

We wouldn't want to do that.

You don't know

how badly a leg hurts when it's broken, does he?
RONNIE:

I got my big bone broken.

My

little bone's not broken.
ROBBIE:
arm.

You should have seen Jamie's

He fell off the horse when he was breaking it.
RONNIE:

He got bucked off.

ROBBIE:

His bones, both of them, were

broken off like that.

Two bones were sticking out of

his arm.
THE COURT:
Well, that's all boys.

Oh boy, that's terrible.

Will you tell him, please,

Rob?

(Whereupon, this portion of the proceeding
was concluded on this 6th day of June, 1985.)
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3
4

I, Tamara A. Boys,

5

Shorthand

6

present

7

in the foregoing

8

shorthand

9

the foregoing

R e p o r t e r , do hereby

at and

reported

notes

transcript;

that
the

form,

11

p r o c e e d i n g s , as requested,

12

set

proceeding

accurate

reduced

comprising

further, the

transcript

I was

I thereafter

to typewritten

10

foregoing

record

in this matter

of

the

on the da

forth.

13
14

certify

in shorthand

matter, that

is a full and

Professional

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I-have
set my hand

on this

19th day of June,

hereunto

1985.
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17
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Tamara A. Boys
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Professional Shorthand Reporter
Residing in Poison, Montana
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